The autonomy of autonomy: On Jürgen Habermas's Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie.

I also agree fully with Habermas's claim that the "detranscendentalizing" move beyond Kant toward a discursive conception of morality (which was possible after Peirce) represented a further progressive step; but I would distinguish between a "detranscending" move away from religious to autonomous morality and a "detranscendentalizing" step, which is quite a different matter. Autonomous morality, after all, also proved to be strong enough, historically speaking, to challenge and overcome religious restrictions of morality, allowing the learning process of modernity to unfold historically, the very process that Habermas stresses. But these are all I extramoral i motives from a Kantian or post-Kantian viewpoint, and thus we would declare only those moralities to be "strong" that go beyond moral motives and leave autonomy behind, because they require an anchor external to morality. Although Kant saved the "deontological substance of a morality of reason and of rational natural law" (" I deontologische Substanz von Vernunftmoral und Vernunftrecht i ", I, p. 166), he had to make a clear separation between the religious conception of "redemptive justice" ( I rettende Gerechtigkeit i ) and deontological morality, shifting from divine to self-given, rational moral law (I, p. 166f.). [Extracted from the article]