Über das Unbemerkbare in der Wahrnehmung. Eine phänomenologische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Standpunkt der analytischen Philosophie zum Thema 'Aufmerksamkeit'
In: Husserl studies, Jg. 29 (2013), Heft 2, S. 113-141
Online
academicJournal
- print, 3/4 p
Zugriff:
What we cannot notice, we cannot be perceptually aware of either: This view, still very popular in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, has been recently defended by M. Tye and A. Noë. The present paper tries to undermine this idea by referring to some empirical cases showing that we can be perceptually aware of something which our thematic attention fails to grasp. The limits of perception do not coincide with the limits of attention, and this holds not only in the case of so called primary attention, but also in the case of secondary attention. We therefore reject Arvidson's hypothesis of the identity between the field of attention and the field of consciousness.
Titel: |
Über das Unbemerkbare in der Wahrnehmung. Eine phänomenologische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Standpunkt der analytischen Philosophie zum Thema 'Aufmerksamkeit'
|
---|---|
Autor/in / Beteiligte Person: | BORSATO, Andrea |
Link: | |
Zeitschrift: | Husserl studies, Jg. 29 (2013), Heft 2, S. 113-141 |
Veröffentlichung: | Dordrecht: Springer, 2013 |
Medientyp: | academicJournal |
Umfang: | print, 3/4 p |
ISSN: | 0167-9848 (print) |
Schlagwort: |
|
Sonstiges: |
|